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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM,
Deposit in Lieu of Bail
Civil Practice Act §§ 856, 858, 859, and 860 govern the giving
of a deposit in lieu of bail. Such deposit is deemed the property
of the defendant for purposes of the action and if it remains on
deposit when final judgment is rendered, it must be applied in
satisfaction of the judgment. If a third person makes the deposit,
the money is deemed the property of the third person, subject
however, to the plaintiff's interest therein. Where it is clear that
a third person is making the deposit in lieu of bail for the defendant, under these sections, the fund is to be applied to satisfy plaintiff's judgment.1 7
A third person is presumed to know of the
statutory provisions and, therefore, gives implied assent to them
by the voluntary act of putting the money up.'
In a recent case, the Court of Appeals again held that the
plaintiff is entitled to have the deposited money applied to the
satisfaction of its judgment as against the claim of the third
party,"9 relying on the plain meaning of the statute.
The decision in the case was the obvious one under the statute
and previous decisions. The reason, perhaps, that the court allowed appeal was the misapplication by the lower court, in the
instant case and in others, 2 0 of the decision in Finelite v. Sonberg,2
upon which the third person relied. That case was an action by
a creditor of the defendant against the defendant and the third
person. The defendant had assigned the third party's deposit
back to the third party, and then substituted bail for this deposit.
The only issue was whether the assignment had defeated the rights
of defendant's creditors. The rights of the original plaintiff were
not involved in the case.
Statute of Limitations
An action to recover damages for personal injury resulting
from negligence is governed by a three year period of limitation,
C. P. A. § 49(6). Action on contract, express or implied, is governed by a six year statute of limitation, C. P. A. § 48(1). In the
United States, the- "weight of authority is to the general effect
that where a statute limits the time within which an action for
'injuries to the person' may be brought, the statute is applicable
to all actions, the real purpose of which is to recover for an injury
17. Commercial Warehouse Co. v. Graber. 45 N. Y. 393 (1871); Lichter v. Raff,

149 Misc. 53, 266 N. Y. Supp. 748 (N. Y. City Ct. 1933).
18. People ex reL Gilbert v. Laidlaw, 102 N. Y. 588, 7 N. E. 910 (1886).
19. Standard Electric Equipment Corp. v. Laszkowski, 305 N. Y. 58, 110 N. E.
2d 555 (1953).

20. Steinberg v. Frankel, 154 Misc. 179, 276 N. Y. Supp. 694 (N. Y. City Ct.

1935). 21. 75 App. Div. 455, 78 Ni. Y. Supp. 338 (1st Dep't 1903).
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to the person, whether based on contract or tort ...
Some support
for this general proposition is found [in New York].-" 22
The only indication of the view of the Court of Appeals,
directly applicable, is dictum in Sch'midt v. Merchants Dispatch
Transp. Co., to the effect that, "the Legislature may, if it choses,
impose one period of limitation for a cause of action to recover
damages for a personal injury arising from negligence and different periods of limitation for a cause of action for the same injury
where liability may arise on other grounds; and, in determining
which period of limitation applies to a particular cause of action,
the criterion is the origin and naturc of the liability asserted." 3
However, it has been held in New York that an action for
breach of implied warranty as to the fitness of goods under Personal Property Law § 96(1) may be maintained, independent of,
or without proof of, a showing of negligence. "4 The Statute of
Limitations was not involved in these decisions.
In a recent case, 5 the Court of Appeals was faced with the
problem of breach of warranty versus negligence, and of which
statutory period to apply. Plaintiff sued as administrator for
his infant son who died from burns incurred when a cowboy suit
he was wearing came in contact with a flame and ignited. Action
was brought more than three years after the accident to recover
damages for the boy's pain and suffering before death. The complaint contained many causes of action, but the only one considered
by the court was breach of an implied warranty of fitness for use
against the immediate vendor of the cowboy suit. Defendant's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was in reality one
in negligence and governed by a three year limitation was denied
in the lower court and by the Court of Appeals.
By this case, the Court of Appeals has, at last made a direct
holding on the problem. The court rejected, the harsh ruling of
-the Schlick case2 6 (breach of warranty action disallowed where
plaintiff injured from glass in jam, because three year negligence
statute barred the action) and accepted the view of courts of other
22. See Note, 157 A. L. R. 763, 766 (1944), citing only two applicable cases,
Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N. Y. 287, 200 N. E. 824 (1936);
Schlick v. New York Dugan Bros., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (N. Y. City Ct.
1940). See, 10 BaOOKLYN LAW REV. 180 (1940).
23. Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co., supra note 22 at 299, 200 N. E.
at 826.
24. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105
(1931) ; Gimenez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27
(1934) ; Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557 (1938).
25. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N. Y. 140, 111 N. E. 2d 421 (1953).
26. Schlick v. New York Dugan Bros., spra note 22.
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states.2 7 Now, by this more lenient policy, damages for personal
injuries beyond the value of the goods purchased may be had in a
breach of warranty action, where negligence may not be involved,
without confining the plaintiff to the three year limitation.
Res Judicataand Election of Remedies
"Res judicata is a common law doctrine designated to bar
'litigation of an adjudicated claim."" 8 The test of whether the
same cause of action has been previously adjudicated has been
variously expressed. Judge Lehman defined the test as, "the
violation of but one right by a single legal wrong . . . the subjec
Judge Cardozo
matter and the ultimate issues are the same." '2
determined that, "a judgment in one action is conclusive in a latei
one . . . when the two causes of action have such a measure of
identity that a different judgment in the second would
'30 destroy or
impair rights or interests established by the first."
In a recent case, 31 these tests were applied by the court. The
plaintiff originally sued for money due him under an oral contract
of employment. The complaint was dismissed on the grounds that
the contract did not comply with the Statute of Frauds. Leave to
amend the complaint was granted, and the amended complaint set
forth a cause of action for an accounting based on the oral agreement. After trial, the judgment was directed for the defendant,
the court holding that the action was still barred by the Statute
of Frauds. Plaintiff then commenced'an action in quantum meruit.
The defendant moved under Rule 107 to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals held that the
previous contract action was not a bar to a quantuom meruit suit.
"The two actions involve different 'rights' and 'wrongs' . . . The
rights and interests established by the previous adjudication will
not be impaired by a recovery . . . in quantum meriit."32
The court reinforced its determination with cases where an
action on an express contract did not preclude recovery in qua n~zun
meruit, in the same action. 3 Other cases cited pointed up the
27. Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. 2d 199 (1933) ; Gotten v. Owl Drug
Co., 6 Cal. 2d 683, 59 P. 2d 142 (1936); Schuler v. Union News, 295 Mass. 350, 4
N. E. 2d 465 (1936).
28. PRAsHxKER, NEW YORK PRACTICE 194 (2d ed., 1951).
29. De Coss v. Turner & Blanchard, Inc.. 267 N. Y. 207, 211, 196 N. E. 28, 30
(1935).
B. & C. Realty Corp., 250 N. Y. 304, 306-7, 165
30. Schuylkill Fuel Corp. -,.
N. E. 456, 457 (1929).
31. Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N. Y. 66, 111 N. E. 2d 209 (1953).
32. Id. at 72, 111 N. E. 2d 212.
33. Young v. Farwell, 165 N. Y. 341, 59 N. E. 143 (1901) ; Marsh v. Masterton,
101 N. Y. 401, 5 N. E. 59 (1886).

